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Abstract
We present large-sample evidence on the performance of domestic and U.S. (foreign) bidder rms
acquiring Canadian targets. Domestic bidders earn signicantly positive average announcement-
period abnormal returns, while U.S. bidder returns are indistinguishable from zero. Measures of
pre- and post-acquisition abnormal accounting performance are also consistent with a superior
domestic bidder performance. Domestic bidder announcement returns are on average greatest
for oers involving stock-payment and for the bidders with the smallest equity size relative to
the target. Neither direct foreign investment controls, horizontal product-market relationships,
nor acquisition propensities explain why domestic bidders outperform their U.S. competitors.

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Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited:
Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada
I. Introduction
The proposition that a competitive market for corporate control eectively limits managerial di-
vergence from shareholder wealth maximization implies that corporate takeovers are benecial to
shareholders of both rms involved in the transaction. However, while there is substantial evidence
that shareholders of target rms on average realize large capital gains from corporate takeovers,
the evidence on the protability of takeovers for shareholders of bidder rms is mixed. Studies
measuring abnormal stock price behavior around takeover events in the U.S. report average bidder
rm performance that ranges from signicantly positive in all-cash tender oers and horizontal
mergers in the 1960s, to signicantly negative in all-stock exchange mergers in the 1980s. Gains
to bidders are generally found to be lower the greater the degree of observed competition for the
target, whether from incumbent management or from rival bids.
1
Furthermore, there is some ev-
idence, particularly from studies examining corporate earnings, of a declining average bidder rm
performance over the two-to-ve year period following merger announcements which some authors
argue should be attributed to the merger itself.
2
While the empirical evidence is consistent with the proposition that competition among bidder
rms grants most (if not all) of the rents from merger activity to target shareholders, it is also widely
recognized that standard event-study methods tend to produce attenuated estimates of the total
returns to bidder rms. This attenuation bias arises when public knowledge of the acquiring rm's
prior merger activity leads to partial anticipation of future merger bids. Furthermore, when the
target rm is small relative to the bidder, as is typical in studies sampling U.S. mergers,
3
the power
of the event-study methodology to register a given dollar gain is also relatively weak. Third, some
1
See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Roll (1986), and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) for extensive reviews of the
evidence prior to 1988. More recent large-sample evidence, see, e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Loderer and Martin
(1990), Schwert (1996), and Betton and Eckbo (1999).
2
See, e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989).
3
In the "Large Merger Series" of the Federal Trade Commission's Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, a
typical sample source prior to 1985, the bidder rm is on average more than ten times the size of the target (measured
by the value of total equity).
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takeover announcements have a high ex ante probability of triggering negative regulatory response
or target management resistance. In the presence of such triggering events, the abnormal return at
the initial acquisition announcement understates the total gains from a successful takeover.
As a result of these econometric diculties, the question of the true magnitude of the gains to
bidder rms remains an important, but largely unresolved empirical issue. We address this issue
using a sample exceeding 1,800 domestic and foreign (all U.S.) successful acquisitions in Canada over
the period 1964-1983, prior to the introduction of substantive Canadian antitrust laws governing
acquisitions. This sample presents an interesting laboratory for examining the performance of
two distinct groups of bidders (foreign and domestic) operating in the same (Canadian) corporate
control market, and it increases our knowledge of the general performance of U.S. bidder rms. Also,
comparisons of the performance of the two sets of bidders to a great extent control for changes over
time in the underlying structure of the corporate control market. This is relevant in terms of
separating, e.g., the eect of bidder size (which varies across the two bidder groups) from the eect
of increased competition in the takeover market (which aects both bidder groups equally). In
studies of U.S. domestic acquisitions, it has been shown that bidder gains are largest in the 1960s
and for the smallest bidder rms (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Loderer and Martin (1990)),
but it is not clear whether size per se or the generally less competitive acquisition market in the
1960s is the main explanation for the positive bidder returns during this time period. Competition
in the U.S. market for corporate control generally increased in the 1970s with the introduction of
mandatory disclosure rules and a minimum (20-day) waiting period for public tender oers as well
as with the emergence of investment-bank brokered takeover deals.
4
We begin by reporting new evidence that successful domestic bidders on average earn signif-
icantly positive abnormal stock returns over the month of the rst press-announcement of the
acquisition as well as over the two-day announcement period itself. This nding is robust with
respect to alternative estimation procedures, and it is also to some extent supported by perfor-
mance measures based on accounting returns. In contrast, the average performance of U.S. bidders
4
Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Eckbo and Langohr (1989) examine the eects of the introduction of disclosure
rules on takeover premiums.
2
in Canada is indistinguishable from zero and signicantly lower than the average performance of
domestic bidders.
The paper discusses several potential explanations for the superior announcement returns of do-
mestic bidders. First, we present new evidence on the eects of foreign direct investment controls
in eect during the second half of our sample period. After 1972, foreign bidders in our sample
were required to seek prior government approval before acquiring Canadian target rms. This
approval procedure imposes costs on foreign bidders if it delays the acquisition process or reduces
the foreign bidder's bargaining power with the target rm. Interestingly, we show that Canadian
bidders outperform U.S. foreign bidders also in the sample period before the foreign review process
existed, and that foreign bidders exempted from the review process earn insignicant abnormal
returns as well. Thus, the foreign direct investment review procedure does not explain our nding
of superior performance of domestic acquirors. Second, it is possible that domestic bidders, perhaps
due to a superior knowledge of Canadian markets, are in a better position than foreign bidders to
exploit economic synergies following the takeover. Determining the source of synergy gains requires
data on acquisition-induced changes in the rms' organizational structure, nancing- and produc-
tion/investment strategy, which is generally unavailable. However, an examination of horizontal
versus conglomerate acquisitions fails to support the hypothesis that the superior domestic bidder
performance is limited to horizontal cases.
Third, we stratify our sample according to the payment method in the acquisition (all-cash, all-
stock, or a mix of cash and stock). As reviewed by Hirshleifer (1995), a number of theories suggest
that the bidder's choice of payment method reects private information about the bidder's own
stand-alone value or the value of the target's resources under the bidder's control. The evidence
discussed here suggests that the valuation impact of the payment method is signicantly dierent
in Canada than in the U.S.. In particular, all-stock oers (as well as mixed cash-stock bids)
generate signicantly positive average announcement eects in Canada, which contrasts with the
signicantly negative market reaction documented by Travlos (1987) for all-stock mergers in the
U.S.. As reviewed by Eckbo and Masulis (1995), there is substantial evidence that U.S. equity
3
markets are characterized by adverse selection, which tends to cause a negative market reaction
to the average equity issue. Moreover, there is much less evidence of a similar negative market
reaction to equity issues internationally, including Canada. Thus, the superior domestic bidder
performance possibly reects a lower degree of adverse selection associated with the implicit equity
issue in a Canadian domestic all-stock acquisition.
Fourth, we discuss issues related to relative size and partial anticipation of acquisition activity
on our performance estimates. We show that the smallest Canadian bidders have the greatest
average announcement returns. With the average U.S. bidder being eight times the size of the
average domestic bidder, the insignicant abnormal returns to U.S. bidders is in part a reection
of relatively low precision in the abnormal return estimates for relatively large rms. Finally,
we document a surprisingly similar acquisition frequency in the samples of domestic and foreign
bidders. Moreover, following Malatesta and Thompson (1985, 1986), we perform structural tests for
evidence of partial anticipation eects in the data. However, we nd no support for the hypothesis
that an attenuation bias due to partial anticipation of acquisition activity helps explain the relatively
poor U.S. bidder performance in Canada.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data selection procedure
and provides evidence on the sample-wide average protability of bidder rms using both abnormal
stock returns and abnormal earnings. Section III analyzes whether foreign investment controls,
industry competition, and the payment method explain the superior performance by domestic
bidders. A discussion of potential statistical eects of acquisition frequency and relative bidder size
on the estimates of abnormal stock returns is given in section IV, while section V concludes the
paper.
II. Average gains to domestic and foreign bidders
In this section we present estimates of average monthly and daily abnormal stock price performance
around the acquisition announcement, as well as annual abnormal earnings. In order to gauge the
sensitivity of the conclusions to the method of estimation, we show results using both percentage
4
returns and dollar values, dierent estimation periods relative to (before and after) the event, as
well as alternative specications of the return generating process.
A. Sample selection
Our sample of domestic acquisitions is compiled by Eckbo (1986), while the foreign acquisitions are
sampled here from the Merger Register of the Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate
Aairs (which is also the original data source for the sample of domestic cases in Eckbo (1986)).
The Merger Register contains a total of 9,294 merger and acquisition bids announced between
January 1945 and December 1983, of which 7,559 were announced after January 1, 1964. The
Register records all mergers in industries subject to the 1910 Combines Investigation Act, given
the merger is announced in the news media, including newspapers, trade journals, and business
magazines in Canada, the United States and Britain.
The following characterizes the sample selection:
(1) The merger bid occurs between January 1964 and December 1982, is successful (i.e., accepted
by target shareholders), and the date of the rst press announcement of the acquisition is
listed in the Merger Register.
(2) Either the target rm is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) or the bidder rm is
listed on the TSE or on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and there is sucient (as
dened below) stock return data to perform the event study analysis.
Hostile takeovers were almost non-existent over the sample period, and none of the sample ac-
quisitions elicited a hostile reaction by target management. The sample period ends prior to the
introduction of civil antitrust laws governing corporate combinations in Canada. During the sample
period, neither domestic nor U.S. bidders faced a threat of antitrust interference in the Canadian
corporate control market.
For TSE-listed rms, stock return data are taken from the University of Laval monthly returns
tape and the University of Western Ontario daily returns tape. Stock return data for NYSE-listed
5
bidders are from the University of Chicago CRSP les. As shown in Table 1, of the population
of 7,559 acquisition bids reported in the Merger Register over the sample period, a total of 1,846
acquisitions are included in the sample. Of the target rms in these acquisitions, all are Canadian
rms, and 345 are listed on the TSE. Moreover, there are 394 NYSE-listed (foreign) and 1,261
TSE-listed (domestic) bidders in the sample.
B. Average abnormal stock returns
Table 2 and Figure 1 show monthly abnormal stock returns to the TSE- and NYSE-listed bidder
rms and the TSE-listed target rms over the 25-month period -12 through 12 relative to the month
of the rst press announcement of the acquisition. The abnormal returns are computed using the
market model in excess return form:
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
jt
; (1)
where r
jt
is the continuously compounded rate of return on security j over month t, r
ft
is the
continuously compounded rate of return on (U.S. or Canadian) Treasury bills which mature at the
end of month t,
5
r
mt
is the continuously compounded rate of return on the value-weighted portfolio
of all stocks traded in the market over month t;
6
and 
jt
is assumed to be a normally, identically
distributed, serially uncorrelated zero mean disturbance term.
In order to account for the possibility that the merger event itself changes the regression constant

j
and/or the systematic risk 
j
, two sets of coecients are estimated under this procedure, one
based on data before the merger event and one based on data after the event. The rst set of
coecients, (
b
j
; 
b
j
), is estimated using a maximum of 48 and a minimum of 24 monthly returns
drawn from relative month -60 through month -13. The second set of coecients, (
a
j
; 
a
j
), is
estimated using a maximum of 48 and a minimum of 24 monthly returns drawn from relative
month 13 through month 60. Month zero is the month of the rst press-announcement of the
5
The U.S. risk-free rate was derived from the T-bills on the CRSP bond tape, while the Canadian rate was derived
using information published by the Bank of Canada.
6
The U.S. market is provided by CRSP, while the Canadian market was derived using the rms on the Laval tape.
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merger. Abnormal return over event month  is then computed as
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(2)
where superscript carets denote OLS-estimates. Thus, in Table 2, a pre-event benchmark is used to
estimate abnormal returns up through month 0, while a post-event benchmark is used to estimate
performance after month 0. If a rm has insucient data to perform the regression in the `after'
period, the `before' coecients (
b
j
; 
b
j
) are used to predict returns up through month 2. Similarly,
when there is insucient data to perform the regression in the `before' period, the `after' coecients
(
a
j
; 
a
j
) are used to predict backwards through month -2.
Table 2 reports the average abnormal return for month  relative to the event (
1
N

P
N

j=1
^
j
;
where N

is the number of rms in the sample having valid abnormal returns in month ), and the
cumulative average abnormal return. A Z-statistic, which in large samples has a standard normal
distribution provided the merger events are independent, is used to infer statistical signicance.
The Z-statistic for the average abnormal return is computed as
Z


1
p
N

N

X
j=1
^
j
^

j
a
 N(0; 1):
As in Theil (1971, pp.122-123), an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation 

j
is given by
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2
;
where R
m
is the vector of observations on the independent variables in period  , R
m
is the matrix
of observations on the independent variables used in the estimation period, and ^

j
is the OLS
estimate of the standard error of the regression disturbances over the estimation period.
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A visual impression of the cumulative average abnormal return for each subsample is presented
7
In the bottom two rows of Table 2, Z-value for the average abnormal returns cumulated over L event months 
1
through 
2
is given by
Z

1

2

1
p
L

2
X
=
1
Z

:
This Z-statistic presumes that the monthly average abnormal returns are serially independent as well.
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in Figure 1. The 332 targets listed on the TSE earn on average cumulative abnormal returns of
11.40% over the 12 months prior to and including the month of the acquisition announcement, with
a signicant 3.59% over the announcement month itself (Z=6.25). The 1261 domestic bidder rms
listed on the TSE earn on average 3.64% over the period from month -12 through month 0, with a
signicant 1.27% in the announcement month (Z=4.51). Figure 1 also conrms the positive average
share price development for domestic bidders up through the announcement month. In contrast,
the 390 foreign bidders listed in the NYSE show no signicant average abnormal returns over any
of the event periods. In particular, over the year following the acquisition, cumulative abnormal
returns to NYSE bidders average -3.72% with an insignicant Z-value of -1.53.
Table 3 provides information on the robustness of the announcement period abnormal return
estimates from Table 2 with respect to the choice of estimation period and the use of monthly
versus daily stock returns. In Table 3, and throughout the rest of the paper, the month 0 abnormal
return is estimated by adding a dummy variable d
jt
to equation (1), where d
jt
takes on a value of
one in the announcement month and zero otherwise:
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
: (3)
In this model, the event parameter 
j
directly isolates the component of the rm's return which is
due to the acquisition. Since there is only one acquisition event per regression, the event dummy
d
jt
and the excess return on the market are uncorrelated. Consequently, the estimate of 
j
from
equation (3) is identical to that obtained from a two-step procedure such as in equation (2).
8
The
month-zero estimates reported in Panel I and II of Table 3 dier from the corresponding month-zero
estimate in Table 2 only because the estimation of 
j
in Table 3 does not mix data from the pre-
and post-event period.
Panel I of Table 3 reports the average estimate of 
j
when the estimation period is month -60
through -13. The average announcement-month abnormal return to TSE-listed bidders is 1.13%
or $6.89 million, both of which are statistically signicant at the 1% level or higher. Using a
8
The estimate of the standard error of 
jn
is now provided directly by the OLS regression routine.
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post-event estimation period (panel II) yields a slightly higher event parameter: on average 1.81%
or $9.48 million. The abnormal returns to NYSE-listed bidders remain insignicant regardless of
the estimation. Finally, Panel III of Table 3 reports abnormal return estimates using daily return
data. In these regressions, the risk-free rate is excluded and the event-dummy d
jt
takes on a value
of one for the two-day announcement period (day -1 and day 0). As shown, TSE-listed bidders
realize a statistically signicant average two-day announcement period abnormal return (2^) of
0.81%, or $0.64 million, with Z-values of 4.23 and 3.40, respectively. The two-day announcement
period abnormal return for NYSE-listed bidders is an insignicant 0.08%. In sum, the nding of
signicantly positive average abnormal stock returns to TSE-listed bidders and insignicant gains
to NYSE-listed bidders in Canada appears robust.
C. Average abnormal changes in earnings (EBIT)
Table 4 reports estimates of average abnormal earnings changes around acquisition events using
the following conditional market model:
E
jt
= 
ej
+ 
ej
E
mt
+ 
ejn
d
jtn
+ 
ejt
(4)
where E
jt
is rm j's change in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) recorded by Compustat
over year t (where information on EBIT for Canadian bidders is found in the Canadian section of
the U.S. Compustat tape as well as in a separate Compustat le for Canadian rms), E
mt
is the
equal-weighted average EBIT across all Compustat rms in year t (where E
mt
is constructed using
U.S. companies only for the U.S. bidders in the sample, and Canadian rms only for the domestic
bidders in the sample), E
mt
is the change in E
mt
over year t, and 
ejt
is a mean zero error term.
The estimation period is year -6 through year -2 (where year 0 is the year of the acquisition)
plus the single year n used to dene the dummy variable d
jtn
, n =  1; 0; 1; 2; 3, which takes on
a value of one in year n and zero otherwise. Thus, in order to avoid overparameterization, the
ve 
ejn
-coecients are estimated using ve separate regressions, always using the pre-acquisition
period -6 through -2 as the comparison period. The market model is estimated using the rst
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dierence (as above), and the rate of change, 100  (E
jt
  E
j;t 1
)=E
j;t 1
, in earnings from period
t   1 to t. When the regression uses the rate of change in earnings, data from year -7 is added
in order to create an observation for year -6. Earnings data for target rms ends in year 0. The
regression is run only once for a given rm over a given estimation period; i.e., the estimated value
of, e.g., 
j0
covers the cumulative eect of all acquisitions undertaken by rm j over that year. The
table uses the sample of bidders and targets with a complete set of earnings data available on the
S&P Compustat les for years -7 through year 0. Some rms have missing data for one or more of
the event-years 1 through 3, thus the sample sizes underlying the estimation of the event parameter
for these years are somewhat smaller.
As shown in Table 4, the estimated values of  are all highly signicant, indicating that in-
dividual rm earnings are highly correlated with the general earnings of the market. Moreover,
there is a signicant dierence in the average abnormal earnings change coecients ^
e
for years
n =  1 and n = 0 for TSE-listed and NYSE-listed bidders when expressed in percentage terms. For
example, TSE-listed bidders experience signicantly positive abnormal earnings changes in year -1
and year 0 of 12.30% and 21.37%. The corresponding abnormal earnings changes for NYSE-listed
bidders is a signicant -8.23% and -17.56%, respectively. When measuring abnormal earnings in
dollar terms, however, TSE-listed bidders outperform NYSE-listed bidders in year -1 but not in the
announcement year. From panel III we also see that TSE-listed targets on average experience large
positive abnormal earnings changes over years -1 and 0 of 56.32% and 49.76%, respectively, with a
signicantly positive dollar-value abnormal earnings change in year 0. Thus, domestic acquisitions
tend to occur after a period of superior earnings performance, while foreign bidders tend to make
a bid after a period of abnormally low (negative) changes in earnings.
Turning to the post-acquisition event parameters in Table 4,(n = 1; 2; 3), the results show that
the generally positive pre-acquisition abnormal earnings performance of TSE-listed bidders is typi-
cally followed by a continued positive drift except in year +3. NYSE-listed bidders tend to continue
the negative pre-acquisition abnormal earnings performance throughout the post-acquisition event
period, with the exception of year 3 when the average dollar-value abnormal earnings is a signicant
10
$12.43 million.
Overall, the results indicate that TSE-listed bidders show superior earnings performance as well
as superior stock price performance relative to NYSE-listed bidders in Canada. We now turn to
an examination of various possible explanations for this dierential performance. For this purpose,
the analysis focuses in particular on the announcement-month abnormal return estimated from
equation (3).
III. Economic hypotheses for the superior domestic bidder gains
In this section we examine three factors that potentially drive our evidence of superior gains to
domestic bidders. The rst is the eect of foreign direct investment controls. As described below,
in the second half of our sample period, the "playing eld" was not entirely even for foreign and
domestic bidders acquiring Canadian targets, potentially increasing acquisition costs for foreign
bidders. The second factor concerns a potential advantage to domestic bidders in terms of horizontal
product market relationships with the respective targets. The third factor concerns the valuation
eects of stock as payment method in acquisitions. Most of the sample transactions are stock deals
(the bidder and target exchange shares), and there is substantial extant evidence that bidder gains
in U.S. acquisitions are lower in all-stock than in all-cash transactions.
A. Foreign direct investment controls
Between 1974 and 1984 (i.e., over the latter half of our sample period), acquisitions of Canadian
rms by foreign bidders were regulated under the 1973 Foreign Investment Review (FIR) Act,
enforced by the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). Under Section 2(2) of the FIR Act, a
foreign bidder were required to disclose plans to expand, modernize, relocate or close existing target
facilities, and the extent of Canadian participation on both ownership and control of the merged
rm. On the basis of the disclosed information, FIRA would determine (possibly after negotiations
with the bidder) whether the acquisitions would provide "signicant benets" to Canada.
The FIR Act was in part motivated by the Gray Report (1972) which lists several poten-
11
tially \undesirable impacts" of foreign direct investments in Canada, allegedly restricting Canadian
sovereignty over its industrial policy. For a vivid account of the events which led to the FIR Act,
and the international (in particular, the U.S.) reaction to the resulting unilateral trade restriction,
see Clarkson (1982). FIRA considers Canadian participation as a key consideration in determining
"signicant benets" for industries already dominated by foreign ownership. A further positive
consideration is avoidance of bankruptcy. "Small" acquisitions (i.e., targets with less than 250,000
dollars in assets, less than 3 million in revenues, and less than 100 employees) do not have to
meet the signicant-benet test, only a "no detriment" test. The power of FIRA to review foreign
acquisitions was eventually curtailed in 1985.
According to FIRA annual reports, approximately 2,100 foreign acquisition attempts were re-
viewed between 1974 and 1984, with an approval rate of 90%. Since the source of our merger
sample is the Merger Register, there are no disapproved FIRA cases in our data base. Of the 394
foreign acquisition in the sample, 172 were reviewed (and approved) by FIRA while the remaining
222 were not subject to review (200 cases took place before the 1974-introduction of the FIR Act
while 22 cases were exempted in 1976 and 1977). The 172 approved FIRA cases are distributed
evenly over the 1974-1983 period.
The hypothesis of interest is that compliance with the requirements under the FIR Act trans-
ferred some or all of the expected rents from the acquisition to target shareholders, or to other
Canadian interests protected by FIRA in its bilateral negotiations with the bidder rm. In testing
this hypothesis, recall that since our sample is restricted to foreign bidders listed on the NYSE, we
tend to pick up the largest foreign acquisitions (measured in terms of the asset size of the bidder)
reviewed by FIRA. The largest foreign acquisitions tend to be the most politically controversial,
which further strengthens FIRA's bargaining power. Thus, if FIRA has succeeded in extracting a
signicant portion of the gains to successful foreign bidders, it is more likely reected in the sample
used here than in a randomly selected sample of FIRA cases. Thus, if anything, our sample is bi-
ased towards nding evidence which supports the conclusion that FIRA has successfully extracted
rents from foreign acquirors.
12
Table 5 provide some direct evidence on this issue. NYSE-listed bidder rms earn negative
but insignicant abnormal stock returns regardless of whether or not the case was reviewed by
FIRA. Moreover, TSE-listed bidders continue to show signicantly positive announcement-month
abnormal returns both before and during FIRA's review activity. In sum, there is no apparent
eect of FIRA's activities on the average U.S. bidder in our sample. In particular, the results reject
the hypothesis that FIRA's review activity has made the NYSE-listed bidders in Canada worse
o. Notice also that TSE-listed bidders earn lower abnormal returns during the 13-month period
-12 through 0 during the period with FIRA review (-2.16% versus 4.38% before 1974). Similarly,
there is no evidence of an increase in the gains to TSE-listed targets during the period with FIRA
reviews. Thus, if FIRA succeeded in transferring rents from the NYSE-listed foreign bidders to
Canadian interests, there is no evidence in Table 5 that domestic bidders or targets beneted from
such a transfer.
The proposition that FIRA eectively helps target shareholders extract a larger share of the
total merger gains can also be examined using samples of target rms in foreign acquisitions before
and after FIRA was established. Only 10 of the 172 mergers reviewed by FIRA involve a TSE-listed
target rm present in the data base. Although not included in Table 5, the cumulative average
abnormal return for these 10 targets turns out to be 13.3% over the -12,0 interval, compared to
10.3% for the remaining targets involved in acquisitions not reviewed by FIRA. We cannot reject
the hypothesis that these two cumulative average abnormal returns are equal. Overall, there is no
evidence that the enforcement of the FIR Act has aected either the level or distribution of merger
gains between the two parties directly involved in the transaction.
B. Industry competition
Intuitively, synergistic gains are more likely to occur when there is a horizontal relationship between
the bidder and target rms. Thus, it is possible that domestic bidders tend to outperform foreign
acquirors because purely domestic acquisitions tend to involve more closely related bidder and
target rms. Table 6 sheds some light on this issue by showing average abnormal returns for
13
horizontal versus non-horizontal acquisitions in our sample for which product market information
could be identied from Moody's manuals or the Standard & Poor's directories. A relationship
is dened as horizontal if the target and bidder rms operate in the same major two-digit or
four-digit Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) industry, respectively. As seen from the table,
there is little indication that a horizontal relationship between the bidder and the target increases
the average gains to bidders.
9
The largest, signicant abnormal returns occur in the "2-digit non-
horizontal" category for TSE-listed bidders, while there is no evidence of signicantly positive gains
to NYSE-listed bidders, horizontal or otherwise.
10
C. The payment method
Several studies report that takeover premiums and merger-induced abnormal returns are system-
atically related to the payment method. Huang and Walkling (1987), Franks, Harris and Mayer
(1988), and Eckbo and Langohr (1989) show that gains to target rms in the U.S., England, and
France, respectively, are signicantly higher in all-cash oers than in takeovers in which the bidder
and target rms exchange common stock. Studying merger bids in the U.S., Travlos (1987) reports
signicantly negative two-day announcement period average abnormal stock returns to bidder rms
in all-stock mergers, while the corresponding bidder rm performance in all-cash mergers is zero or
positive. Moreover, Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) present evidence that bidder gains in
Canada are on average greatest when the bidder oers a mix of cash and stock.
The literature focuses in particular on taxes and information asymmetries to explain these
empirical regularities. The tax codes in the countries represented by the above studies generally
award a tax{deferred status to a pure exchange merger while requiring capital gains taxes to be
paid immediately in an all{cash purchase.
11
Thus, it is frequently hypothesized that the bidder
must raise the oer premium in an all{cash oer in order to compensate target shareholders for the
9
While not shown in Table 6, a similar conclusion emerges when examining abnormal returns to targets.
10
Eckbo (1992) examines the eect of merger announcements on the equity values of product market rivals of the
target rms in Canadian and U.S. domestic horizontal mergers and rejects the hypothesis that merger gains are the
result of increased market power.
11
The payment method may also dictate the bidder's accounting treatment of the acquisition, thus aecting de-
preciation tax shields and accounting-based managerial compensation schemes. [see, e.g., Carleton, Guilkey, Harris
and Stewart (1983)]. For a general discussion of tax arguments, see Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson (1988).
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tax penalty associated with this particular method of payment. However, while tax considerations
are certain to play a role in the bidder's choice of payment method, tax arguments do not appear
to explain the relatively large premium in all-cash oers. Furthermore, Franks, Harris and Mayer
(1988) report that a superior target performance in all-cash oers is found in UK takeovers that
took place before the introduction of capital gains taxes on such transactions.
Asymmetric information also plays a role in the choice of the medium of exchange in takeovers.
As a simple illustration, suppose the true bidder value is common knowledge while the true target
value is private information (known by the target only). The bidder knows the distribution over
possible target values including its maximum, t

, and suppose the bidder's strategy is to bid t

in
order to guarantee success. Then, if the bidder pays with cash, the expected value of the bid is
t

 E(tj accept) > 0; (5)
which we label "the expected overpayment cost of cash". Alternatively, suppose the bidder oers
payment in the form of securities in the combined rm (all-stock oer). Let z

denote the fraction
of the equity in the combined rm oered to the target that guarantees target acceptance:
z

(b+ t

) = t

 ! z

=
t

b+ t

; (6)
where b is the known bidder value. The expected value to the bidder of this all-stock oer is
z

[b+E(tj accept)] E(tj accept) =
b(t

 E(tj accept)
b+ t

> 0; (7)
which we label "the expected overpayment cost of stock". Comparing the two expected overpayment
costs in (5) and (7), since
b
b+t

< 1, the bidder strictly prefers securities to cash as the method
of payment. Intuitively, while the value of a cash oer does not depend on the true value of the
target ex post, payment in bidder shares forces the target to share in the overpayment cost ex
post. Of course, if we allow the true value of the bidder to be private information as well (two-sided
information asymmetry), then the above preference for a stock oer is reversed provided the bidder
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shares are suciently undervalued by the target.
12
Extending this intuition, Eckbo, Giammarino
and Heinkel (1990) derive a fully separating equilibrium consistent with the use of a mix of cash
and securities, and where the proportion of the total bid value paid in cash is a signal of the true
bidder value. Thus, the dierence between the average gains to bidders in the U.S. and Canadian
samples studied here may to some extent reect dierences in the signaling eect of the payment
method.
Table 7 shows the average abnormal returns to bidders across categories of payment methods
for a subset of our domestic acquisitions. The abnormal return estimation follows our equation (3),
i.e., 
j
is the abnormal return parameter for the announcement month. All-cash oers on average
lead to an increase of 3.11% in the bidder's share value over the event month, which is marginally
signicant with a Z-value of 1.80 and with only 47.9% of the sample having positive abnormal
return. The larger group of all-stock oers have statistically signicant average abnormal return
of 2.99% (Z-value 2.18, 65% positive). Moreover, the average bidder presenting a mixed oer gains
a highly signicant 5.10% abnormal return over the announcement month (Z-value of 4.61, 64.9%
positive). The hypothesis that the average abnormal return in mixed oers is the same as in the
all-cash or all-stock oers is rejected at the 1% level of signicance.
13
While we do not have data on the payment method in the sample of foreign acquisitions, the
12
With two-sided information asymmetry, let
^
b denote target belief about bidder value. In this case, the all-stock
oer z

which guarantees success is given by z

(
^
b+ t

) = t

, and the dierence between the expected overpayment
cost of an all-stock and an all-cash oer equals
t

(b 
^
b)  (t

 E(tj accept)
b+E(tj accept)
which can be positive or negative depending on whether the target undervalues (b 
^
b > 0) or overvalues (b 
^
b < 0)
the bidder shares. Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989) and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) all dene various
tradeos between expected overpayment costs, undervaluation costs and, in the case of bids with a success-probability
less than one, the cost of lost synergy gains, to derive signaling equilibria where the market reacts to the information
concerning the bidders choice of payment method.
13
Using a subsample of the cases in Table 7, Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) perform regression tests of the
hypothesis that the incremental gain in mixed oers represents an average signaling gain or simply a larger average
synergy revaluation in this particular oer category. Their model implies that the announcement eect (bidder
abnormal return) is increasing and convex in the proportion of the bid that is paid in cash, i.e.,

j
= h
j
(
c
j

t
); h
0
j
; h
00
j
> 0;
where c
j
is the cash payment,

t is the average pre-bid target value, and the "
0
" and "
00
" denote rst and second
derivatives, respectively. Using cross-sectional regressions, they nd no support for convexity.
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results in Table 7 can be compared to extant evidence on the eect of the payment method on
bidder gains in U.S. domestic takeovers. Travlos (1987) reports that average bidder returns in
all-stock oers are small but negative, while average bidder returns in all-cash oers are positive.
The negative impact of all-stock oers in the U.S. thus contrasts with the signicantly positive
eect of all-stock and mixed stock-cash oers reported in Table 7. One potential explanation for
this dierence is that the equity issue implicit in a stock oer suers from an adverse selection
problem of the type analyzed in Myers and Majluf (1984), and that the potential for adverse
selection is greater for U.S. than for Canadian domestic bidder rms.
14
Adverse selection is a
consequence of information asymmetry between the issuer and outside investors, and we expect
merger negotiations to eectively resolve much of this asymmetry. Nevertheless, since the target
is in Canada, it is possible that NYSE investors remain informationally disadvantaged relative to
TSE investors when it comes to judging the true value of both the target and the bidder's oer.
IV. Econometric hypotheses for the superior domestic bidder gains
In this section we explore hypotheses concerning the measurement of bidder gains using announce-
ment period stock returns. The precision of the estimate of a given dollar gain is lower the greater
the normal variation in the bidder's (dollar) equity value. There is also a risk that announcement
returns provide attenuated estimates of the economic value of the merger. The central question is
whether the superior domestic bidder performance is an artifact of the econometric methodology.
A. Relative size of bidder
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) regress the merger-induced abnormal returns to bidder rms
on the relative size of target to bidder and nd a statistically signicant, positive coecient. This
is consistent with a measurement problem for relatively large bidders: the greater the normal
variation in the bidder's equity value, the more dicult it is to register a given bidder gain from
the acquisition. Similarly, Loderer and Martin (1990) estimate cross-sectional models of bidder
14
Consistent with this view, Eckbo and Verma (1992) report less negative market reaction to seasoned equity oer
announcements in Canada than in the U.S..
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returns that indicate that bidder returns are signicantly higher when the oer value exceeds 30%
of the acquiring rm's equity value, and signicantly lower when the market value of the bidder's
equity exceeds $150 million. They nd evidence of signicantly positive acquiring rm returns only
in the smallest size category. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) also nd evidence that bidder abnormal
returns tend to increase with the relative size of the target.
As shown earlier in Table 2, the average total equity value of the TSE-listed targets is approxi-
mately the same for both groups of bidders, while the total equity value of the average U.S. bidder
is more than eight times the value of the average domestic bidder. Moreover, as shown in Table
8, of 1,226 TSE-listed bidders, 905 or 74% have an equity value of $100 mill. or less, while of 341
NYSE-listed bidders, only 61 or 18% of the bidders fall in this size category. Since the average
target size is similar across the domestic and foreign bidders, a ranking of the bidders on bidder
size is highly correlated with a ranking on the relative size of the target. Since relatively few of the
target rms have publicly traded equity, we focus in Table 8 on the total equity value of bidders in
order to maximize sample size.
The results in Table 8 for TSE-listed bidders show a tendency for bidder abnormal returns to
decrease with increasing bidder size. For the 309 smallest bidders, with total equity values less than
$10 million, the average abnormal return is 4.05% with a highly signicant Z-value of 5.40. For
bidder equity values exceeding $40 million (543 cases or 44% of the sample), the average abnormal
returns are largely insignicant (with the exception of 60 < V
j;t 1
 70). Notice also that when
bidder gains are measured in terms of dollar values, seven of the eleven size groups (including
the largest, where V
j; 1
> $100 mill.) indicate statistically signicant bidder gains, with no clear
relationship to bidder size. These results support the argument that estimates of a given dollar
gain to bidder rms, particularly when measured as a percentage of equity, suers an attenuation
bias that increases with bidder equity size.
Turning to the NYSE-listed bidders in Table 8, there is little evidence of signicant bidder gains
regardless of the size group and whether one measures gains in percentage or dollar terms. There
is slight evidence of positive gains in the very smallest size group (V
j; 1
<$100 mill.), with an
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average ^ of 2.12% (Z-value 1.89) or $1.69 mill. (Z-value 1.67). These results are as expected since
even the smallest NYSE-listed bidders are large compared to the TSE-listed bidders, thus creating
potentially serious measurement problems across all size groups.
B. Partial anticipation of acquisition activity
Since the market reacts to the unanticipated portion of the information in the acquisition an-
nouncement, partial anticipation of acquisition activity attenuates the announcement-eect. A
number of approaches have been implemented that address this problem. For example, Schipper
and Thompson (1983) focus on the announcement of entire acquisition programs. This announce-
ment is arguably at the beginning of the process that leads the market to partially anticipate future
takeover activity. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Loderer and Martin (1990), and Song and
Walkling (1998) focus in particular on initial acquisition announcements following a "dormant" pe-
riod. Such announcements are also a priori less predictable. A third approach is to explicitly model
the acquisition probability, as in Malatesta and Thompson (1985, 1986) and Eckbo, Maksimovic,
and Williams (1990). Below we exploit the Malatesta-Thompson (henceforth MT) framework in
order to shed light on the degree to which our sample acquisitions were partially anticipated.
Before invoking the MT-framework, note in Table 9 the actual frequency distribution of the
total number of acquisitions (N
j
) performed by our TSE-listed and NYSE-listed bidders over the
twenty-year sample period. For domestic bidders, total acquisition activity is given by the total
number of targets listed in the Merger Register for each bidder rm over the sample period (columns
two and ve). For NYSE-listed bidders, N
j
is given by the number of targets announced in theWall
Street Journal. The average number of acquisitions per bidder is 6 for TSE-listed bidders and 9 for
NYSE-listed bidders. Table 9 partitions N
j
into ten subgroups, ranging from 1 to 25 (the sample
maximum). The percentage of the bidders that fall into each of the ten groups is surprisingly similar
across TSE-listed and NYSE-listed bidders. If the market's estimate of acquisition frequency reects
the distribution of N
j
in Table 9, then it is dicult to argue that the degree of partial anticipation
is signicantly greater in the U.S. than in the domestic sample.
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The MT-model implies that the event-parameter 
j
estimated from equation (3) provides an
unbiased estimate of bidder j's total acquisition gain (v
j
) even if the market assigns a positive
probability q
j
that an acquisition will be announced in each period. Specically, the announcement-
eect of an acquisition is given by (1   q
j
)v
j
, while the market reduces the bidder's stock price
by  q
j
v
j
in the 'no acquisition' event. Market eciency implies that the unconditional expected
abnormal return across the two mutually exclusive events equals zero, i.e.,
[(1  q
j
)v
j
jd
j
= 1] + [ q
j
v
j
jd
j
= 0] =  q
j
v
j
+ (v
j
jd
j
= 1) = 
j
+ 
j
d
j
= 0; (8)
where, as in equation (3), d
j
is a zero-one conditioning variable for the event of an acquisition
announcement. MT further assume that expected returns are generated by a one-factor model
such as the CAPM, i.e.,
E(r
jt
)  r
ft
= 
j
[E(r
mt
)  r
ft
]: (9)
Adding (8) to the right-hand side of (9) yields our original conditional market model (3) with

j
=  qv and 
j
= v.
Our earlier conclusion that TSE-bidders on average outperform NYSE-bidders holds a fortiori
under the MT-framework since 
j
is unbiased for v
j
even if q
j
> 0. Furthermore, it is interesting
to compare the average values of 
j
across the two categories of bidders in order to infer in which
sample the market assigns the greatest prior probability of an acquisition event. As shown in Table
9, for NYSE-listed bidders seven of the ten estimated values of the average 
j
are negative and
signicant at the 1% level. The average value of 
j
for TSE-listed bidders is typically larger in
absolute value and six of ten are signicant at the 1% level.
The variation in the average estimate of 
j
across domestic and foreign bidders raises the
question of whether dierences in 
j
reects systematic dierences in v
j
or in q
j
(or both). In order
to address this question, we isolate the value of q and test the following hypothesis:
H
0
:


=
 qv
v
=  q = 0 (10)
For the purpose of this test, we form the sample average (1=N)
P
j
(
j
=
j
) which (under the cen-
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tral limit theorem) is distributed asymptotically normal. Estimating the variance of = cross-
sectionally, a standard t-test rejects H
0
at the 1% level for each of the two bidder groups. However,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the value of q implied by = is the same for domestic and
foreign bidders. These conclusions hold whether measuring abnormal returns in percentage terms
or in terms of dollar values. In sum, it appears that the market assigns a non-zero prior acquisition
probability that is similar across our TSE-listed and NYSE-listed bidder rms.
V. Conclusions
The literature on corporate acquisitions indicates that gains to bidder rms in the U.S. are largely
insignicant. While the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that competition among bidder
rms drives the rents from acquisition activity to the target shareholders, it is also widely recognized
that measured bidder abnormal returns may contain an attenuation bias. The bias may arise when
the bidder is large relative to the target (and therefore also relative to the dollar gain in the
transaction), or when the market anticipates takeovers based on the bidder's record as a frequent
acquiror. As a result, it is dicult to assess the true performance of U.S. bidders.
This paper addresses the controversy over the true gains to bidder rms by studying a large
sample of domestic and foreign acquisitions in Canada. The foreign bidders are all U.S. rms
listed on the NYSE. We nd robust evidence that domestic bidders realize signicantly positive
announcement-month (and two-day announcement period) abnormal stock returns. At the same
time, U.S. bidders in Canada earn statistically insignicant abnormal returns. This evidence is also
corroborated by abnormal annual earnings data.
The paper performs several investigations into the possible source of the dierential performance
of the two categories of bidder rms. First, we test and reject the hypothesis that foreign direct
investment controls in place during the second half of our sample period has reduced average gains
to the NYSE-listed foreign bidders in our sample. Second, TSE-listed bidders that outperform
their U.S. counterparts tend to undertake conglomerate rather than horizontal acquisitions. Thus,
a relative product-market disadvantage to foreign bidders does not appear to explain the superior
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domestic bidder performance. Third, we show that the market tend to react positively to domestic
bids where the payment is in the form of bidder shares. This is in contrast to extant evidence for U.S.
domestic acquisitions where all-stock oers on average are associated with a non-positive or even
negative market reaction. The negative market reaction is consistent with adverse selection eects
in U.S. issue markets, and our analysis raises the question of whether the greater announcement-
returns to domestic all-cash oers is the result of lower adverse selection eects of Canadian targeted
domestic equity issues.
Finally, we show that the most protable domestic acquisitions are the ones where the bidder and
targets have similar total equity sizes. The U.S. bidders in our sample are on average eight times the
size of their Canadian counterparts, which suggests that the insignicant U.S. bidder performance
in part reects a measurement problem. We also document similar acquisition frequencies across
domestic and U.S. bidders, and we fail to reject structural tests of the hypothesis that the market
assigns similar prior acquisition probabilities to the NYSE-listed and the TSE-listed bidder in our
sample.
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Table 1
The Annual Number of Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in the Population and in the Sample,
1964-1983
Year of Acquisitions Acquisitions in sample
2
acquisition in TSE-listed TSE-listed NYSE-listed
announcement population
1
Total bidders targets
3
bidders
1964 197 54 40 4 14
1965 224 57 41 5 14
1966 196 42 34 5 7
1967 212 62 40 10 18
1968 378 128 81 18 40
1969 471 113 87 14 21
1970 409 102 74 9 23
1971 380 114 91 16 15
1972 428 140 112 20 16
1973 354 143 105 29 21
1974 277 106 86 19 9
1975 265 98 67 22 21
1976 316 103 69 30 12
1977 394 145 75 47 41
1978 448 41 21 8 16
1979 510 106 55 26 32
1980 415 81 56 17 20
1981 498 95 68 19 15
1982 573 77 29 16 37
1983 614 39 30 11 2
1964-82 7,559 1,846 1,261 345 394
1
The population is the Merger Register, compiled annually by Consumer and Corporate Aairs Canada, which
covers reported mergers and acquisitions in industries subject to the Combines Investigation Act. The Merger
Register contains a total of 9,294 cases over the period January 1945 through December 1983.
2
The sample is drawn from the Merger Register over the period 1964-83 and requires that, at the time of the merger,
either the target rm was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) or the bidder was listed on the TSE or the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Furthermore, a case was excluded if the Merger Register did not give the day
of the press announcement, and if the rm did not satisfy the minimum data requirement for estimating abnormal
stock returns, as described in the text.
3
Of the 345 TSE listed targets, 166 were targets of TSE listed bidder rms and 48 were targets of NYSE listed
bidder rms. The remaining 131 targets were acquired by bidders whose shares were not publicly traded.
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Table 2
Monthly Average Abnormal Stock Returns to Canadian Targets and Domestic and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders.
Total Sample, 1964-83.
Percent average monthly abnormal return over the year prior to and following the month of the rst press announce-
ment of the acquisition (month 0) where the abnormal return to rm j over month  is computed as the excess return
market model prediction error
^
j
=
(
r
j
  [r
f
+ ^
b
j
+
^

b
j
(r
m
  r
f
)] for  12    0
j   [r
fr
+ ^
a
j
+
^

a
j
(r^
m
  r
fr
)] for 1    12;
where r
j
; r
f
and r
m
are the continuously compounded rates of return to rm j, the risk-free asset and the value-
weighted market index over event month  , and the market model coecients are estimated using a minimum of
24 and a maximum of 48 months from the before-event period -60 through -13 (^
b
j
;
^

b
j
) or the after-event period 13
through 60 (^
a
j
;
^

a
j
).
1
Bidders on the TSE
2
(N = 1261) Bidders on the NYSE
3
(N = 390) Targets on the TSE
4
(N = 332)
Event Average Cumulative Average Cumulative Average Cumulative
^

Z

average ^

Z

average ^

Z

average
month (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
-12 -0.45 -0.92 -0.45 -0.46 -1.26 -0.46 -0.41 -0.81 -0.41
-11 0.07 1.39 -0.38 0.79 1.84 0.33 0.09 0.36 -0.32
-10 0.61 2.57 0.23 0.11 0.56 0.43 0.49 1.30 0.18
-9 0.19 1.71 0.42 0.76 2.04 1.20 -0.27 -0.29 -0.09
-8 -0.41 -0.95 0.01 -0.61 -1.97 0.58 0.74 0.78 0.66
-7 -0.12 0.04 -0.11 0.41 0.79 0.99 -0.02 -1.19 0.64
-6 0.04 1.01 -0.07 0.21 0.78 1.20 -0.15 0.05 0.49
-5 0.63 2.07 0.55 -0.22 -0.52 0.98 -0.22 -0.09 0.27
-4 0.66 3.17 1.21 -0.71 -1.83 0.26 1.03 2.64 1.29
-3 0.28 0.54 1.49 -0.13 0.38 0.38 0.14 2.78 2.77
-2 0.43 2.09 1.93 0.39 1.53 0.52 1.18 2.46 3.95
-1 0.44 1.96 2.37 -0.11 -0.40 0.41 3.86 7.75 7.81
0 1.27 4.51 3.64 -0.19 -0.79 0.22 3.59 6.25 11.40
1 -0.18 -0.03 3.45 -0.40 -1.19 -0.17 -0.88 -1.59 10.51
2 0.12 0.83 3.57 0.17 0.39 -0.00 0.24 0.14 10.75
3 0.26 0.59 3.82 -0.49 -1.05 -0.49 2.70 2.05 13.45
4 0.79 2.94 4.62 -0.06 -0.12 -0.55 -1.28 -0.79 12.17
5 -0.45 -0.91 4.17 -0.13 0.47 -0.68 -0.40 -1.25 11.78
6 -0.31 -1.00 3.86 -0.46 -0.37 -1.13 0.08 0.66 11.86
7 0.03 0.73 3.89 -0.72 -1.72 -1.85 -1.42 -1.65 10.45
8 0.47 1.78 4.36 0.07 0.27 -1.79 0.03 -0.27 10.48
9 -0.25 -0.79 4.12 -0.59 -1.07 -2.38 0.73 1.14 11.21
10 -0.44 -0.57 3.67 -0.67 -1.16 -3.05 0.25 0.99 11.46
11 -0.77 -1.37 2.90 -0.05 -0.04 -3.09 0.21 0.73 11.67
12 0.11 0.61 3.01 -0.40 -0.20 -3.49 -1.80 -2.21 9.87
[ 12; 1] 4.24 2.37 0.56 0.41 4.55 7.81
[1; 12] 0.81 -0.63 -1.53 -3.72 -0.59 -1.53
1
The reported Z

  value of the average abnormal return is distributed approximately standard normal and is given
by Z

 (1=
p
N

)
P
j
^
j
=^

j
, where ^


is the estimated standard error of the abnormal return 
j
and N

is the
total number of cases with valid (non-missing) abnormal returns in period  .
2
The average market value of total equity in month -12 is CAD$69 million.
3
The average market value of total equity in month -12 is US$450 million.
4
The average market value of total equity in month -12 is CAD$53 million.
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Table 3
Announcement-Induced Average Abnormal Returns to Domestic and Foreign Bidders under
Alternative Estimation Procedures. Total Sample 1964-83.
OLS-estimates of the abnormal return coecient 
j
in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in the event period and zero otherwise; and

jt
is a zero mean disturbance term. The event period is the month of the acquisition announcement when using
monthly stock returns and the day of the announcement and the previous day when using daily stock returns. When
using daily stock returns (Panel III), the risk-free rate r
ft
is excluded from the regression. Furthermore, with daily
data the total event period abnormal return is 2^
j
, which is the number reported in the table.
Sample Average Percent Percent signicant (5%) Z-
Sample size (N) ^
1
j
positive positive negative value
2
I. Monthly returns and pre-event estimation period (month -60 through month -13)
3
Bidders on TSE 1099 1.13% 52.0 5.5 2.5 3.30
1097 $6.89 million 56.0 12.0 6.8 10.10
Bidders on NYSE 371 0.16% 50.0 2.6 2.7 0.12
367 $-6.81 million 54.0 9.0 8.2 0.11
II. Monthly returns and post-event estimation period (month 13 through month 60)
3
Bidders on TSE 1227 1.81% 55.2 5.3 2.5 5.75
1225 $9.48 million 52.0 7.3 3.4 7.17
Bidders on NYSE 343 0.87% 55.1 2.3 1.2 2.01
340 $-0.23 million 59.4 3.2 3.5 1.87
III. Daily returns and post-event estimation period (day -1 through day 480)
4
Bidders on TSE 464 0.81% 53.7 7.1 2.2 4.23
430 $0.64 million 53.3 6.1 3.0 3.40
Bidders on NYSE 385 0.08% 50.4 3.9 2.6 0.57
1
Abnormal dollar returns are obtained by estimating 
j
after premultiplying the terms (r
jt
  r
ft
) and (r
mt
  r
ft
)
with V
j;t 1
, the prior end-of-period market value of total equity.
2
Z = (1=
p
N)
P
j
^
j
=^

j
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample size and ^

j
is the estimated standard error of 
j
.
3
To be included, a rm must have a minimum of 24 valid returns over the 48-month period as well as a valid return
in month 0. The dummy variable takes on a value of 1 in event month 0. The twelve months (-12 through -1) in the
before-event estimation and (1 through 12) in the after-event estimation procedure are excluded.
4
To be included, a rm must have 150 valid return observations drawn over the 480 trading-day estimation period.
The average ^
j
for the NYSE-listed bidders is reported in % terms only due to lack of access to the CRSP daily stock
price le.
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Table 4
Average Annual Abnormal Changes in Earnings to Canadian Targets and Domestic and Foreign
(U.S.) Bidders in the Year Prior to through Three Years Following the Year of the Acquisition,
1964-83.
OLS-estimates of the abnormal earnings coecients 
ejn
in the following market model:
E
jt
= 
ej
+ 
ej
E
mt
+ 
ejn
d
jtn
+ 
ejt
where E
jt
is rm j's change in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over year t, E
mt
is the equal-weighted
average EBIT across all rms on the S&P Compustat tape in year t, E
mt
is the change over year t in E
mt
, and 
ejt
is a mean zero error term. The estimation period is year -6 through year -2 (where year 0 is the year of the merger)
plus the single year n used to dene the dummy variable d
jtn
, n =  1; 0; 1; 2; 3, which takes on a value of one in
year n and zero otherwise. Thus, the ve 
ejn
-coecients are estimated using ve separate regressions, always using
the pre-acquisition period -6 through -2 as the comparison period. The market model is estimated using the rst
dierence (as above), and the rate of change, 100  (E
jt
  E
j;t 1
)=E
j;t 1
, in earnings from period t  1 to t. Data
on EBIT for the Canadian rms in the sample is drawn from the Canadian rms on the U.S. Compustat le and
from a separate Compustat le for Canadian rms. The market EBIT is constructed using U.S. companies only for
the sample of bidders listed on the NYSE, and Canadian companies only when regressing the model using Canadian
rms. The regression is run only once for a given rm over a given estimation period; i.e., the estimated value of, e.g.,

j0
for a given rm in principle covers the cumulative eect of all mergers undertaken by that rm over that year.
When the regression uses the rate of change in earnings, data from year -7 is added in order to create an observation
for year -6. Earnings data for target rms ends in year 0.
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Average ^
ejn
(Z-value and percent positive in parentheses)
1
Unit ^
e
^

e
Year n =  1 Year n = 0 Year n = 1 Year n = 2 Year n = 3
I. Bidder rms listed on the TSE (N = 303)
$ million 0.55 0.82 3.92 1.65 1.67 0.30 3.98
(18.20;72.3) (16.04;67.3) (20.27;61.7) (14.34;62.0) (11.98; 60.0) (6.32; 55.3) (13.01;56.0)
% 6.76 -1.48 12.30 21.37 6.06 6.45 -13.34
(20.71;75.2) (-10.94;62.0) (17.32;53.1) (20.34;53.5) (7.10; 50.0) (6.80; 49.7) (-11.56; 41.3)
II. Bidder rms listed on the NYSE (N = 215)
$ million 7.87 1.29 -12.72 2.07 -0.25 -4.65 12.43
(16.85;75.8) (13.79;74.9) (-11.58;56.7) (5.32;55.4) (1.63; 54.0) (-3.06; 53.0) (7.16; 56.2)
% 11.93 1.86 -8.23 -17.56 -19.09 -25.45 -10.15
(%) (18.08;76.3) (10.38;67.4) (-3.55;45.6) (-4.50;41.5) (-4.02; 39.5) (-5.30; 37.4) (-2.01; 37.0)
III. Target rms listed on the TSE (N = 79)
$ million -1.09 0.39 -3.24 8.32
(2.21;55.7) (6.42;69.6) (-0.31;54.4) (4.10;62.0)
% 1.09 0.10 56.32 49.76
(3.97;64.6) (4.50;62.0) (3.66;55.7) (4.06;61.0)
1
Z = (1
p
N )
P
j
^
ej
=^

ej
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample size and ^

ej
is the estimated standard error of 
ej
.The
table uses the sample of bidders and targets with a complete set of earnings data available on the S&P Compustat
les for years -7 through year 0. Some rms have missing data for one or more of the event-years 1 through 3, thus
the sample sizes underlying the estimation of the event parameter for these years is somewhat smaller.
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Table 5
Average Abnormal Returns to Canadian Targets and Domestic and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders Before
and During FIRA's Merger Review Activity.
1
OLS-estimates of the abnormal return coecient 
j
in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in the event period and zero otherwise; and

jt
is a zero mean disturbance term. The estimation period is month -60 through month -13, while the event period
is either the 13-month period month -12 through month 0 (the announcement month) or the announcement month
itself.
Sample Event Average
2
Percent Z-
Sample size (N) Period ^
j
positive value
3
I. Foreign bidders listed on the NYSE
NYSE-bidders not 222 Month 0 only -0.76% ($ -2.5 million) 51.1 -1.59
reviewed by FIRA Month -12 through 0 -0.84% ($ -8.2 million) 45.8 -0.37
NYSE-bidders 172 Month 0 only -0.73% ($ -8.8 million) 43.3 -1.64
reviewed by FIRA Month -12 through 0 0.29% ($ -1.1 million) 47.7 0.03
II. Domestic bidders listed on the TSE
TSE-bidders before 586 Month 0 only 0.72% ($ 0.3 million) 53.0 2.10
FIRA (1964-73) Month -12 through 0 4.38% ($ 4.5 million) 51.2 3.71
TSE-bidders during 513 Month 0 only 0.80% ($ 1.2 million) 52.6 2.07
FIRA (1974-83) Month -12 through 0 -2.16 ($ 3.6 million) 47.5 -0.34
III. Domestic targets listed on the TSE
2
TSE-targets before 151 Month 0 only 6.17% ($ 0.4 million) 58.9 6.46
FIRA (1964-73) Month -12 through 0 15.27% ($ 2.3 million) 55.4 5.07
TSE-targets during 262 Month 0 only 2.35% ($ 0.6 million) 57.8 4.02
FIRA (1974-83) Month -12 through 0 7.61% ($ 5.3 million) 55.0 3.51
1
A case is classied as 'reviewed by FIRA" according to information in FIRA annual reports. Of the 394 foreign
bids in our sample, 172 were reviewed and approved by FIRA, while 222 were not subject to review. Of the 222
cases, 200 took place before the introduction of the FIR Act in 1974, and 22 cases were exempted from review in
1976 and 1977. From 1974-1983, FIRA reviewed a total of 2,127 cases of which 204 (or 10%) were disapproved. Since
our sample is restricted to successful acquisitions, there are no disapproved cases in our data base.
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2Abnormal dollar returns are obtained by estimating 
j
after premultiplying the terms (r
jt
  r
ft
) and (r
mt
  r
ft
)
with V
j;t 1
, the prior end-of-period market value of total equity. To be included, a rm must have a minimum of 24
valid returns over the 48-month period -60 through -13.
3
Z = (1=
p
N)
P
j
^
j
=^

j
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample size and ^

j
is the estimated standard error of 
j
.
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Table 6
Average Abnormal Returns to Domestic (Canadian) and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders in Horizontal and
Non-Horizontal Acquisitions, 1964-83.
OLS-estimates of the abnormal return coecient 
j
in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in month 0 and zero otherwise; and 
jt
is a zero
mean disturbance term. The estimation period is month 13 through month 60, excluding months 1 through 12. Total
sample of bidder rms classied by whether or not the merging rms operate in the same 2-digit Standard Industrial
Classication (SIC) industry (\2-digit horizontal") or in the same 4-digit SIC industry (\4-digit horizontal").
1
(Z-values and percent positive in parentheses)
Bidder rms listed on the TSE (N = 491) Bidder rms listed on the NYSE (N = 182)
Type of No. of Average Average No. of Average Average
acquisition rms ^
0
^
0
rms ^
0
^
0
(%) ($ million)
2
(%) ($ million)
2
2-digit 158 1.14 18.42 63 1.11 -22.33
horizontal (1.37;55.1) (1.54;51.3) (1.09;57.1) (0.67;65.1)
4-digit 89 1.31 33.73 18 0.26 -115.60
horizontal (0.92;57.1) (1.48;52.4) (-0.20;44.4) (-2.16;55.6)
2-digit 333 1.94 4.91 119 0.57 -1.51
non-horizontal (2.84;55.9) (2.35;52.9) (1.07;52.9) (0.87;55.1)
1
4-digit SIC codes were collected from Moody's manuals and from the Standard & Poor's directories for as many
rms as could be found. A given acquisition is included in this table only if at least one 4-digit SIC code could be
identied for each of the bidder and target rms. Z = (1=
p
N)
P
j
^
j
=^

j
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample size and
^

j
is the estimated standard error of 
j
.
2
The dollar value of the estimated 
j
is obtained by running the regression after pre-multiplying the dependent
variable and the market factor by V
j;t 1
, the prior end-of-period market value of total equity.
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Table 7
Average Abnormal Returns to Domestic (Canadian) Bidders Classied by the Payment Method,
1964-83.
OLS-estimates of the abnormal return coecient 
j
in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in month 0 and zero otherwise; and 
jt
is a zero
mean disturbance term. The estimation period is month 13 through month 60, plus month 0. Information on the
payment method is from the Merger Register, the Financial Post data base, or the manuals of Moody's Corporation.
(Z-values and percent positive in parentheses)
1
Average ^
j
Payment method Sample size % $ million
All-cash N=90 3.11 1.17
(1.80;47.9) (1.93;60.4)
All-stock N=268 2.99 2.93
(2.18;65.0) (2.21;61.7)
Cash and Stock N=58 5.10 5.21
(4.61;64.9) (3.72;64.9)
1
Abnormal dollar returns are obtained by estimating 
j
after premultiplying the terms (r
jt
  r
ft
) and (r
mt
  r
ft
)
with V
j;t 1
, the prior end-of-period market value of total equity. Z = (1=
p
N)
P
j
(^
j
=^

j
)
as
 N(0; 1) where N is the
sample size and ^

j
is the OLS estimate of the standard deviation of 
j
.
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Table 8
Average Monthly Abnormal Returns to Domestic and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders Classied by the
Market Value of the Bidder's Total Equity, 1964-83.
OLS-estimates of the abnormal return coecient  in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= a
j
+ 
j
(r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in the event period and zero otherwise; and r
jt
is a zero mean disturbance term. The estimation period is month +13 through month +60, i.e., excluding months
+1 through +12. V
j; 1
is the market value of total equity of the bidder rm in the month prior to the month of the
acquisition announcement.
1
(Z-value and percent positive in parenthesis)
1,226 bidder rms listed on the TSE 341 bidder rms listed on the NYSE
Range of No. of Average ~ Average~ Range of No. of Average ~ Average~
V
j 1
($ million) Firms
2
(%) ($ million) V
j; 1
($ million) rms
2
(%) ($ million)
0 < V
j; 1
 10 309 4.05 0.20 0 < V
j; 1
 100 61 2.12 1.69
(25.2) (5.40;61.2) (3.20;50.9) (17.9) (1.89;59.0) (1.67;65.0)
10 < V
j; 1
 20 184 2.02 0.23 100 < V
j; 1
 200 62 -1.32 1.56
(15.0) (3.11;55.0) (2.01;52.2) (18.1) (-0.76;45.2) (-0.79;54.8)
20 < V
j; 1
 30 118 1.54 0.13 200 < V
j; 1
 300 42 2.66 6.30
(9.6) (1.89;53.4) (2.44;51.3) (12.3) (1.65;50.0) (2.67;5.2.23)
30 < V
j; 1
 40 73 -1.60 -0.46 300 < V
j; 1
 400 30 0.84 13.68
(5.9) (-1.69;41.1) (-0.11;46.6) (.88) (-0.36;53.3) -0.41;60.0)
40 < V
j; 1
 50 64 0.81 0.41 400 < V
j; 1
 500 16 1.78 8.61
(5.2) (1.00;54.7) (2.07;51.6) (4.7) (1.12;62.5) (0.91;75.0)
50 < V
j; 1
 60 41 2.40 1.19 500 < V
j; 1
 600 14 1.41 11.73
(3.3) (1.29;58.5) (5.27;65.8) (4.1) (0.78;64.3) (0.74;71.4)
60 < V
j; 1
 70 47 2.57 1.75 600 < V
j; 1
 700 21 2.09 13.36
(3.8) (2.18;66.0) (4.54;59.6) (6.2) (1.39;62.0) (1.08;66.72)
70 < V
j; 1
 80 28 1.72 -0.02 700 < V
j; 1
 800 15 1.00 8.56
(2.3) (0.82;50.0) (1.59;39.3) (4.4) (0.55;73.3) (0.72;73.3)
80 < V
j; 1
 90 23 0.00 0.22 800 < V
j; 1
 900 10 -0.38 -6.823
(1.9) (0.96;56.5) (0.44;65.2) (2.9) (0.19;50.0) (0.32;50.0)
90 < V
j; 1
 100 19 2.63 1.55 900 < V
j; 1
 1000 9 -0.88 -13.30
(1.5) (1.57;0.58) (1.42;52.6) (2.6) (-0.55;33.3) (-0.77;22.2)
100 < V
j; 1
321 0.44 35.76 1000 < V
j; 1
61 0.49 -24.16
(26.1) (0.60;51.6) (2.39;51.4) (17.9) (0.77;60.7) (-0.02;57.4)
1
Abnormal dollar returns are obtained by estimating 
j
after premultiplying the terms (r
jt
  r
ft
) and (r
mt
  r
ft
)
with V
j;t 1
, the prior end-of-period market value of total equity. To be included, a rm must have a minimum of 24
valid returns over the 48-month period -60 through -13. Z = (1=
p
N)
P
j
^
j
=^

j
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample
size and ^

j
is the estimated standard error of 
j
.
2
In this column, the number of rms in percent of the total sample is given in parentheses.
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Table 9
Average Monthly Abnormal Returns to Domestic and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders Classied by the
Bidder's Acquisition Frequency over the Sample Period, 1964-83.
1
OLS-estimates of the constant term  and the abnormal return coecient  in the excess return market model
r
jt
  r
ft
= 
j
+ 
j
r
mt
  r
ft
) + 
j
d
jt
+ 
jt
where r
jt
; r
ft
and r
mt
are the continuously compounded rates of return to security j, the risk-free asset and the
value-weighted market index over period t; d
jt
takes on a value of one in the event period and zero otherwise; and 
jt
is a zero mean disturbance term. The estimation period is month +13 through month +60, i.e., excluding months
+1 through +12. For the bidder rms listed on the TSE, the total acquisition activity is given by the number of
targets in the sample, based on the information in the Canadian Merger Register. For the bidder rms listed in the
NYSE, the total acquisition activity is given by the number of targets announced in the Wall Street Journal over the
sample period.
(Z-value and percent positive in parenthesis)
1
Total Number of
acquisitions (N
j
) 1,227 bidder rms listed on the TSE 328 bidder rms listed on the NYSE
per bidder rm
over the 1964-83 No. of Average ~ Average ~ Number of Average ~ Average ~
period rms
2
(%) (%) rms (%) (%)
1  N
j
 2 272 -2.45 0.95 32 -2.29 1.58
(22.2) (-4.36;41.5) (0.72;50.4) (9.8) (-6.18;28.1) (1.13;59.4)
3  N
j
 5 200 -0.16 2.85 59 -1.96 -0.36
(16.3) (-0.65;49.3) (5.31;59.0) (18.0) (-7.89;32.2) (-0.52;47.5)
6  N
j
 7 165 2.23 2.47 45 -1.41 -0.24
(13.4) (3.37;60.0) (2.75;55.2) (13.7) (-4.37;37.8) (0.04;40.0)
8  N
j
 10 160 -2.73 1.00 77 -1.91 1.34
(13.0) (-3.27;45.0) (1.51;55.6) (23.5) (-7.54;29.9) (1.49;61.0)
11  N
j
 12 77 -1.15 2.23 38 -1.41 0.10
(6.3) (-0.07;48.1) (2.70;58.4) (11.6) (-4.36;31.6) (0.13;50.0)
13  N
j
 15 41 0.01 -0.49 34 -0.28 2.55
(3.3) (-0.19;46.3) (-0.86;53.7) (10.3) (0.04;58.8) (1.86;61.8)
16  N
j
 17 49 1.46 2.36 15 0.21 0.69
(4.0) (2.37;71.4) (1.79;57.1) (4.6) (1.04;53.3) (0.09;60.0)
18  N
j
 20 18 10.63 -2.47 17 -1.36 0.65
(1.5) (6.54;77.8) (-1.42;38.9) (5.2) (-2.82;29.4) (0.03;52.9)
21  N
j
 22 20 6.53 0.48 3 1.76 -3.46
(1.6) (4.81;85.0) (0.45;45.0) (0.9) (1.62;66.7) (-.64;33.3)
23  N
j
 25 25 -2.75 0.58 8 -1.49 2.00
(2.0) (-2.12;32.0) (0.46;52.0) (2.4) (-1.58;25.0) (0.87;62.5)
1
To be included, a rm must have a minimum of 24 valid returns over the 48-month period -60 through -13.
Z = (1=
p
N )
P
j
^
j
=^

j
as
 N(0; 1), where N is the sample size and ^

j
is the estimated standard error of 
j
.
2
The number of rms in percent of the total sample is in parentheses.
36
Figure 1
Percent Monthly Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns to Canadian Targets and
Domestic and Foreign (U.S.) Bidders 1964-1983.
The sample contains 332 target firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (T-TSE), 1,261 bidder firms
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (B-TSE) and 390 bidder firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (B-NYSE). All bids are for Canadian targets. Abnormal returns are computed using market
model residuals (equation 2), and the estimation period is five years or 60 monthly return observations.
See Table 2 for details.
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